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THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: ITS CRITICAL ROLE IN
THE REVITALIZATION OF
U.S. PATENT JURISPRUDENCE,
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Donald R Dunner *
Until 1982, the general bias in the United States against specialized
courts prevented the formation of a patent-specific court. However,
without just such a court, the circuit courts of appeals generated
inconsistent results in patent cases, leading to unpredictability in patent
jurisprudence. When the United States faced an innovation crisis in the
early 1980s, indicating that the nation no longer held a position at the
forefront of technological innovations, Congress finally formed the US.
Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit. The court would hear a wider
variety ofpatent cases than had its predecessors, as well as a variety of
cases unrelated to patent law. Despite the apparent need for a court
with some focus on patent cases, there remained a fair amount of
opposition to its creation. Now that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has existed for over twenty-five years, it seems
appropriate to examine what it has done since its inception. This
Article assesses the court's response to the critical need for providing
uniformity and greater predictability in patent law.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has now been
in existence for about twenty-eight years and has had a dramatic
impact on the development of patent law in the United States. This
Article will discuss the innovation crisis that led to the court's
formation in 1982 and the court's response to the critical need for
providing uniformity and greater predictability in patent law.
1. THE INNOVATION CRIsIs THAT LED TO THE
COURT'S FORMATION IN 1982
The concept of a specialized patent court has been around in the
United States for over one hundred years. A general bias against
specialized courts, however, consistently blocked the formation of
such a court. This bias is best reflected in a 1967 statement by a well-
known U.S. district court judge, Simon Rifkind, the co-chairman of
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's Commission on the Patent System,
delivered to the U.S. House of Representatives:
In my view, when you are dealing with a matter that
concerns the general welfare of the United States, it is not
wise to create a small group of men who become, like the
Egyptian priests, the sole custodians of a body of
knowledge and who sooner or later begin to talk a language
that nobody else understands but which is common only to
them and the practitioners that appear before them and who
drift away from those general principles of equity [and]
morality, which pervade the entire judicial system.'
Judge Rifkind's remarks were, of course, directed to the concept of a
specialized court in general, not the Federal Circuit, which had not
been conceived at the time. But it and the similar views of others
stood in the way of the formation of any court with specialized
jurisdiction over patent cases. These hostile views were especially
prevalent among generalist lawyers in the United States.
In the early 1970s, concern was expressed about the limited
ability of the U.S. Supreme Court to oversee and supervise the circuit
courts of appeals. The U.S. Senate accordingly formed the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
commonly known as the Hruska Commission. I was privileged to be
1. General Revision of the Patent Laws: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. No. 3 of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 175 (1967) (statement of J. Simon Rifkind).
776
REVITALIZATION
appointed as one of two consultants (along with a colleague,
Professor James B. Gambrell) to the Hruska Commission to evaluate
the impact of the problem in the area of patent litigation.
In the performance of our duties as patent consultants, Professor
Gambrell and I conducted a survey among patent litigators to
determine, among other things, what their sentiment was toward a
specialized court of patent appeals. The survey results showed an
approximately fifty-fifty split in views, half favoring and half
opposing such a court. As a result, Professor Gambrell and I
recommended against the formation of a specialized court of patent
appeals.
At the same time, however, we noted a significant problem. At
that time, appellate review of patent cases litigated in the many
district courts around the United States took place in eleven different
circuit courts of appeals, depending on the geographic location of the
district courts. Because those circuit courts had widely varying views
of the patent laws-some very friendly to patents and some very
hostile to them-lawyers handling patent cases engaged in mad and
undignified races to the courthouses of their choice in order to
position their clients in the circuit most friendly to their clients'
interests. The end result was an extremely inefficient and unfair
administration of justice in the patent law area, not to mention the
total unpredictability of patent jurisprudence, contingent on who
reached the courthouse first.
In the early 1980s, however, an innovation crisis arose in the
United States over concern that the United States had lost its leading
edge in the making, development, and commercialization of
inventions. To address this and other problems, in 1982 U.S.
President Jimmy Carter convened the Domestic Policy Review on
Industrial Innovation, in one advisory committee of which-devoted
to patents-I participated. At or about the same time, Professor
Daniel J. Meador was assigned to lead the Office for Improvements
in the Administration of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Professor Meador came up with an ingenious idea designed to
address the hostility to specialized courts, an idea that-as I will
discuss-was endorsed by the Carter Domestic Policy Review in its
recommendations as to how to deal with the crisis in U.S. industrial
innovation.
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That idea, of course, led directly to the formation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a nutshell, the idea involved the
combining of two existing courts, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Claims Court, which at the time shared the same
courthouse, immediately adjacent the White House. These existing
courts had jurisdiction over a small percentage of several different
types of patent cases, and thus the twelve judges of the combined
court had some patent experience. The idea of Professor Meador,
however, was not only to expand the number and kind of patent
cases to be appealed to this new combined court but to give the new
court jurisdiction over a large number of non-patent cases so that the
judges would be exposed to diverse areas of the law and would not in
fact be specialized. This new court-which became the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit-was enthusiastically supported by
the Carter Domestic Policy Review and officially supported by the
U.S. Congress during the early days of the administration of U.S.
President Ronald Reagan. The doors of the new court were opened
on October 1, 1982, with the legendary Chief Judge Howard T.
Markey as its first chief judge.
2. THE COURT'S RESPONSE TO THE CRITICAL NEED FOR
PROVIDING UNIFORMITY AND
GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN THE PATENT LAW
Before the Federal Circuit was officially formed by the U.S.
Congress, there was a significant debate by the opponents and
supporters of this new court.
The concerns of the opponents were many. In addition to Judge
Rifkind's Egyptian priest fears, opponents were convinced that the
new court would become a dumping ground for political has-beens,
that the court would inevitably become too pro-patent, and the like.
Proponents of the new court felt that the fears of the opponents
were greatly exaggerated. Moreover, they felt that a court like the
Federal Circuit was needed to eliminate the huge conflicts and
disparities between the views in patent cases of the various federal
circuit courts of appeals and to create much-needed uniformity in
patent law. They were also of the view that such a court would do
much to eliminate the mad and undignified races to the courthouse
fostered by the wide variety of views on patent law issues expressed
by the different federal circuit courts of appeals.
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Now that the court has been in existence for over twenty-five
years, it is appropriate to ask how the court has done. To what extent
have the fears of the court's opponents been realized? And to what
extent have the aspirations of its proponents been achieved?
As I think most will agree, the concern that the court would
become a dumping ground for spent politicians has disappeared. The
quality of the Federal Circuit judges compares with the best of the
U.S. federal circuit courts of appeals. Indeed, as I write, the court's
judges include three former Supreme Court law clerks,2 two former
lower court judges,' two Ph.D. chemists,4 and two law professors,'
one of whom was a law school dean.6 Four of the eleven active
judges were patent attorneys before they joined the court.'
As to the Rifkind Egyptian priest concern, I doubt many would
characterize the court in that manner. While the language they use in
their opinions is more uniformly the language one would hope and
expect to appear in opinions on patent law, it is quite well
understandable to the courts whose opinions they review and is more
than adequately based on general principles of equity and morality
that pervade the entire judicial system, with an occasional lapse here
and there.
What about the concerns that the new court would become too
pro-patent? The short answer to this question is that there is ample
evidence that the court has become neither too pro-patent nor too
anti-patent.
It is true, of course, that the court has-on the pro-patent side-
opened the doors to new technologies such as business methods' and
has interpreted the law in such a way as to make possible meaningful
2. Judges Bryson, Dyk, and Clevenger
3. Judges Mayer and Rader
4. Judges Lourie and Newman
5. Judges Plager and Moore
6. Judge Plager
7. Judges Linn, Lourie, Moore, and Newman (Judge Gajarsa spent a brief period as a patent
attorney at the beginning of his career.)
8. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (June 28, 2010), the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit holdings in AT&T
and State Street Bank but, by a five-to-four majority, left the door open to the grant of business
method patents.
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patent protection in the biotechnology industry.' It has also been
somewhat unreceptive to obviousness arguments under 35 U.S.C. §
103, 1 has removed the straitjacket from the grant of preliminary
injunctions in patent cases," and has sustained huge damage
awards. 12
The court, however, has balanced its pro-patent jurisprudence
with what many would regard as anti-patent holdings. By way of
example, it has made it much harder to prove infringement (best
illustrated by its 35 U.S.C. § 112 T 6 holdings, which deal with
means-plus-function claims, " and its prosecution-history-estoppel
holdings, the most celebrated of which is its Festo holding 14), to
obtain totally speculative damage verdicts, " and to rein in juries
(e.g., taking claim construction away from juries 16 and requiring
particularized testimony and linking argument to support doctrine-of-
equivalents verdicts ").
In sum, the court would appear to have struck a balance between
its pro- and anti-patent holdings.
9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
10. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S.
398 (2007). This lack of receptiveness to § 103 obviousness arguments has been tempered by the
Supreme Court's reversal of the Federal Circuit holding in the KSR case.
11. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chems., 773 F.2d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1985). While the Supreme
Court has criticized the Federal Circuit in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006), for its almost inflexible willingness to support the granting of permanent injunctions in
patent cases, it is still much easier to obtain preliminary injunctions in patent cases now than it
was pre-Federal Circuit.
12. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Fonar Corp. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
13. See, e.g., JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998); B. Braun Med., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
14. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc).
15. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Oiness v.
Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
16. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
17. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Mich., Inc., 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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To what extent has the court eliminated conflicts in the law and
provided greater uniformity in patent jurisprudence?
The early years of the court were devoted to clearing up existing
conflicts in the patent law decisions of the federal appellate courts
and to developing a body of law that would instruct the bar and the
district courts in the proper application of the patent laws. Former
Chief Judge Markey reported with pride that "in its first three years .
. . [the Federal Circuit] identified and resolved all of the thirteen
conflicts in the previous patent law decisions of the regional circuit
courts and removed the slogans that for years had barnacled the
patent law." " More significantly, in those first few years, the court
wrote uncharacteristically long and detailed opinions that-in full
effect-constituted tutorials on sound patent law as the court saw it
for the benefit of the lower courts and the bar. " The court also
rendered a number of en banc decisions, the most notable of which
were its Markman (dealing with claim construction)20 and Warner-
Jenkinson (dealing with the doctrine of equivalents)21 decisions, all
designed to provide uniformity in the law.
The common view is that the court has largely succeeded in its
uniformity efforts. Many still feel, however, that Federal Circuit
predictability is not what it should be and that its decisions are often
panel dependent and result oriented, a characterization that perhaps is
applicable to all federal appellate courts.
What about the venue-related conflicts that predated the Federal
Circuit? Having a single reviewing court for essentially all of the
patent-based holdings of the district courts necessarily reduced the
number of races to the courthouse to secure a favorable venue, but
not completely. Litigants still perceive an advantage in litigating in
their home venues, and many continue to flock to "rocket dockets"
such as the Eastern District of Virginia and the District of Delaware,
both of which are stocked with patent-savvy jurists, and to the
18. Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
577, 577 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d
1452 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Envtl.
Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
20. Markman, 52 F.3d 967.
21. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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Eastern District of Texas, 2 2 perceived by many to be a pro-patentee
venue. On balance, the Federal Circuit has had a beneficial effect in
this area, but perhaps not as great as its proponents envisaged.
And what about the quality of its decision making? To be sure,
some voices of concern have been raised about the functioning of the
Federal Circuit. A group of intellectual property law professors has
filed amicus briefs challenging several important Federal Circuit
patent holdings.23 Two of those professors have written a scholarly
article urging the need to change the system to supplement the
Federal Circuit with a small number of additional circuit courts to
create competition and diversity in the rendering of appellate patent
decisions. 24 One article has suggested that the Federal Circuit system
is broken and seriously in need of repair.25
I respectfully dissent from these views. It is my view and that of
many of my colleagues in the bar that the appellate experiment that
began over twenty-five years ago has been a hugely successful one,
for the reasons spelled out above.
But what about the professors' proposal to supplement the
Federal Circuit with a few appellate courts to create competition and
diversity in appellate review of patent cases? In my view, the cost of
that proposal in terms of decreased uniformity and predictability
greatly outweighs its benefits. More significantly, considerable
competition and diversity of views already exist in the court, as
reflected in the court's resort to the en banc process to resolve
intracircuit conflicts and the generation, when necessary, of strong
dissents, which are not lost on the Supreme Court in its review of
certiorari petitions. To this must be added the increased scrutiny of
Federal Circuit decisions provided by scholarly articles and amicus
briefs and the frequent review of Federal Circuit decisions by the
22. Recent Federal Circuit decisions may negatively impact the frequency of filing of patent
infringement lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas. See In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No.
2010-M938, 2010 WL 2553580 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2010); In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194
(Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
23. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
24. Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101
Nw. U. L. REv. 1619 (2007).
25. Harold C. Wegner, The Invention Court Reinvented: The Federal Circuit at Age 25
(2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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solicitor general under the CVSG 26 process. Much of the benefit of
multicircuit patent jurisdiction is therefore currently available
without the negatives of decreased predictability and uniformity of
decision making. And the current high frequency of Supreme Court
review of Federal Circuit decisions2 7 demonstrates that circuit
conflicts are not necessary to assure appropriate monitoring of
Federal Circuit decisions.
To be sure, there is room for improvement and change. Merely
by way of example, a recent Federal Circuit opinion2 8 suggests a
dialogue is currently ongoing as to whether the court will change its
"no deference" rule in claim construction, a rule that has been widely
criticized inside and outside the court. The court has recognized the
desirability of adding a district court trial judge to its bench,29 as
reflected by the large number of such judges recently sitting with the
court by designation. And I could add still other examples of the
court's ongoing effort to improve and refine the quality of its
decision making.
The bottom line at the conclusion of the first quarter century of
the court's existence is that the court has more than delighted its
early proponents and surprised its opponents with its high level of
performance.
26. CVSG is an acronym for "call for the views of the solicitor general." Under a procedure
that has been used with recently increasing frequency, the Supreme Court has sought the views of
the U.S. solicitor general on whether it should grant certiorari of cases before it. A meaningful
number of patent cases have been included in this process.
27. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (June 28, 2010); Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S.
437; KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. 398; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
28. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
29. District Court Judge Kathleen O'Malley (N.D. Ohio) has recently been nominated to fill
a vacancy on the Federal Circuit.
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